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Government bailouts has been a controversial topic in academe for many years. 
Despite the disputes, most governments would carry out relevant measures to save 
the market when a securities market crisis happened, such as the "Asian Financial 
Crisis" and the "Subprime Mortgage Crisis". Chinese government had also been 
carried out bailout actions for many times through policy interventions, which had 
led to the phenomenon of "Policy Stock Market". Frequ nt bailouts force us to 
consider whether the bailouts are moderate or not. I  order to obtain a right answer, 
we have to interpret the following three questions which are step-up in logic. Firstly, 
should government bailout the market? Secondly, if so, when should the government 
take measures? Last but not the least, how to make sure the bailouts are moderate? 
By analyzing questions above, this article indicates that policymakers should 
correctly handle the relationship between government and market so as to guarantee 
bailouts are moderate. The conclusion could be expatiated as follows: on one hand, 
government shouldn't replace market to allocate resource in the name of bailout. On 
the other hand, government should take measures to alleviate the damages when a 
real crisis happens. During the period of bailout, the legal system of the initiation of 
government bailouts should be improved, in which objects, start conditions, 
measures, retreat time and due process, should be stipulated in the relevant laws and 
regulations. 
Except the preface and conclusion, this article is divided into four chapters: 
In the first chapter, subchapter one defines the concept of moderation of 
bailouts at the beginning, The following threes subchapters are aimed to prove why 
bailouts should be moderate by demonstrating theories of "market failure", 
"government failure" and so on. 
In the second chapter, this paper studies the unmoderation of government 
bailouts in China and makes a deeply self-reflection on the lessons of bailouts 














In the third chapter, this article carefully analyzes the practices of bailouts in the 
U.S.A during the "Subprime Mortgage Crisis", as well as bailouts in Hong Kong 
during "Asian Financial Crisis" from the legal perspective and finds out some useful 
inspirations for improving moderation of bailouts finally. 
In the forth chapter, some suggestions are summarized for improving the 
moderation of government bailouts from the following perspectives: objects, 
initiation, measures, retreat time and procedures, so as to promote securities 
market to develop in a healthy, stable and sustainable manner. 
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